Jurisprudence: Final Examination (August 1971) by William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Exams: 1944-1973 Faculty and Deans
1971
Jurisprudence: Final Examination (August 1971)
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1971 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/exams
Repository Citation
William & Mary Law School, "Jurisprudence: Final Examination (August 1971)" (1971). Faculty Exams: 1944-1973. Paper 260.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/exams/260
FINAL ~.llIl!ATION 
Jurisprudence 
August, 1971 Mr. Bahr 
. The examination consists of four questions of varying weight, totaling 100 
po~nts. Ea:h pr~blem states the 'veight to be given to such problem and a 
sugg:sted t~e l~mit. The suggested time lLmits are based solelY on a pro-
port~on of the total time for the entire examination equal to t he percentage 
weight given to individual problems . Ans\'ler all ~uestions. Do not put your 
name on your bluebook. Be sure that your examination number appears on all 
bluebooks used. 
* * * * 
1. Weight : 30 - Time : 54 minutes 
In the case of Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I. 477 , 479 (1881), the court said, 
by t1atteson, J.: 
"Under it (the conditional sale) the vendee [purchaser] acquires 
not only the right of possession and use~ but the right to become 
the absolute owner upon complying \,iith the terms of the contract. 
These are rights of \-]hich no act of the vendor [seller) can divest 
him 9 and which, in the absence of any stipulation in the contract 
restraining him , he can transfer by sale or mortgage. Upon perform-
ance of the conditions of the sale , the title to the property vests 
in the vendee, or in the event that he has sold , or mortgaged it~ in 
his vendee, or mortgagee , without further bill of sale •.• . These rights 
constitute an ~ctual , present interest in the property, 'vhich, as we 
have seen abc.ve , is capable of transfer by sale or mortgage. It 
P~alyze and discuss. 
II. toJ'eight : 20 - Time : 36 minutes . 
rlEven if sometimes bewildered by technical detail, plagued by wooden-
ness of administration , or outr aged by cynical la~ryer ' s trading on the fact 
that a given matter turns "not on justice , but on law,1i no man can wrestle 
long ,vith the things of law without becoming aware that under the very things 
which sometimes bewi lder , plague or outrage him there pulses an urge for 
right, or decency , or justice ~ a drive tOl-Jard an ideal attribute which· men · 
may well conceive as a proper and indeed the proper ultimate objective of all 
law and of all legal institutions . The concept of Natural La,,, seems to me an · 
expression informed by this urge and directed to its greater realization ; yet 
an expression only partially pffective. because baffled in~ part as it mov~s 
toward realization, Bnf rleli by the ver.y legal. technique ldliciH its objective · 
is to criticize and remedy. Il . 
Discuss. 
III • Weight : 30 - Time: 54 minutes 
". • • . the fact that judges and officials are not wholly free and must not be . 
wholly free~ divides on analysis and closer examination into t\..ro facts. The one 
fact . is concerned ,v.lth the control~ the restraint~ the holding down, of judges 
and officials; the other fact is concerned with the allowing to them of a limited 
degree and a limited kind of lee,·my, and the putting on them. of a duty to exer-
cise their utmost skill and judgment wit.hin that leeway. Both of these facts 
must be seen, and both must be reckoned \vith, by any Jurisprudence Hh1ch aims 
to cover the plain facts and the settled policies of our legal system. For there 
are two kinds of judicial or other official freedom which come into question, and 
the two kinds are very different. It is a fact in our legal system that. judges 
are by no means free to be arbitrary, and our vital need that they shall not be 
free to be arbitrary has been caught into those rationales or doctrines about 
"la,vs and not men, 1l and about " rules determining cases. 1l But it is also a fact 
that our legal system does adjust to the individual case and to changes in our 
conditions and institutions ; and that fact means that judges and other officials 
are free to some real degree to be just and wise, and that we have a vital. need 
that judges and other officials shall continue to be to some real degree free 
to be ~vi.se and just. That fact happens, hm.rever, not to have been caught into an . 
equally familiar, equally sharp~ or equally precious rationale or doctrine. Yet 
it needs to be ; it is no less a vital part of our legal system and of our judges' 
duty. There is the law, which we know as impersonal, and think of as clear ; 
- 2 --
there is the right outcome , which t"e fe e l as also impersonal , and think of as 
hard to find, but capable of being found , and t h e office of the judge is to ful-
fill the demands of both.> together. ! 
Discuss 
IV. Height: 20 - Time : 36 minutes 
"Run through the branches - or the budding tvligs - of the newer .Jurispru-
dence ~ then , and you will see each one growing and hardening to become a good 
spoke of the ~vheel ~ the branch of logical analysis . that of philosophical pos-
tulates, that of ethical values , that of the psychology and experimental logic 
of judicial decision, that of reconvass of the concepts and principles of 
any field of case-lay,]' , that of inquiry into the facts about the life under law 
and of la~v' s effects on that life, that of the nature and vmrk of legal institu-
tions, that of working principles of each one of the legal crafts, that of the 
general p!1i1is ophy. of lail] ~ that of battle upon extravagant dictum - each seeks 
to supplement the other in dealing Hith law ' s jobs of here and noY]. And no 
particular writing comes into perspective until one notes t-Jhich , and how many, 
of such spokes it is addressed to. " 
Discuss 
